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## ãããã¯ãããŠããªããããã³ã°ã²ãŒã 500

This means crypto designers must choose a data type for each variables consistently in their cryptographic schemes.For some cases, it is actually impossible to satisfy such data type assignments.

Even if it is possible, their choice drastically impacts on the efficiency of - PCããã¯ schemes.

Therefore it is interesting how to satisfy and optimize this assignment, but it becomes a complicated task when the scheme is large.

Pairing type satisfiability and optimization problems are formalizations of such tasks.

It is known that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the pairing type satisfiability problem.

However it has been unclear how hard the pairing type optimization problem is.

In this work, we provide a comprehensive theory of pairing type optimization problem, and ããã£ãŒã¿ã²ãŒã ã®æé«åŸç¹ã¯äœã§ãã that there exists no algorithm to solve it in the worst case in time polynomial in the size of input, if P!

Even with many advantages and usefulness of JS, an annoying fact is that many recent cyberattacks such as drive-by-download attacks exploit vulnerability of JS codes.

In general, malicious JS codes are not easy to detect, because they sneakily exploit vulnerabilities of browsers and plugin software, and attack visitors of a web site unknowingly.

To protect users from 5å¹Žçã®ããã®ãéã®ã²ãŒã threads, the development of an accurate detection system for malicious JS is soliciting.

Conventional approaches often employ signature and heuristic-based methods, which are prone to suffer from zero-day attacks, i.

For this problem, this paper adopts a machine-learning approach to feature learning called Doc2Vec, which is a neural network model that can learn context information of texts.

The extracted features are given to a classifier model e.

In the performance evaluation, we use the D3M Dataset Drive-by-Download Data by Marionette for malicious JS codes and JSUPACK for Benign ones for both training and test purposes.

We then compare the performance to ç¡æã®ãããªã²ãŒã ãªã³ã©ã€ã³å°æè» feature learning methods.

Our experimental results show that the proposed Doc2Vec features provide better accuracy and fast classification in malicious JS code detection compared to conventional approaches.

In this paper, we propose an efficient method for secure multiple matrix multiplications over the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan CRYPTO 2011.

Our method is a generalization of Duong et al.

Specifically, in order to minimize both the ciphertext size and the computation cost, our method enables us to pack every matrix into a single ciphertext so that it enables efficient matrix multiplications over the packed ciphertexts.

We also propose several ããªãŠããã«ãžã to obtain practical performance of secure multiplications among matrices with large size and entries.

Furthermore, we show implementation results of our packing method with modifications for secure multiplications among two and three matrices with 32 x 32 and 64 x 64 sizes and entries from 16-bit to 64-bit.

It is an algebraic surface encryption based on a solution problem of indeterminate equations, and has been considered a candidate for post-quantum cryptosystems.

A public key X for this scheme is a polynomial in two variables over a finite ring.

In this paper, we give an improvement on LAA.

Also we explain the this web page between our improvement and the improvement on LAA proposed by Xagawa and examine parameters that those attacks fail by experiments.

As a result, we conclude that if the total degree of the public key X is one, then KRA is more efficient than LAA and if that of X is two, then LAA is more efficient than KRA.

The security of code-based cryptosystems such as the McEliece or the Niederreiter cryptosystems essentially relies on decoding a linear code.

In other words, it has been studying on the difficulty of syndrome decoding problem to check their security.

It is also important to find a suitable candidate even in the era of post-quantum cryptography.

A decoding algorithm due to Prange in 1969 has improved the best known decoding algorithm named information set decoding techniques.

Bernstein in 2010 widen the research in a quantum version by combining Grover's quantum search with Prange's algorithm, which obtain a quadratic speed-up of its original algorithm.

Kachigar-Tillich in 2017 improved Shamir-Schroeppel's and May-Meurer-Thomas's information set decoding algorithms by using Grover's quantum search and a quantum walk techniques which were devised for the subset-sum problem by Bernstein's et al.

In this paper, we studied on the security of a variant of Kachigar-Tillich's algorithm by manipulating the graphs' structure and adjusting the number k of subsets for solving the generalised k-sum problem in quantum walk techniques.

In the meantime, the automotive industry has not been idle.

One of the result of a joint effort by car makers and component suppliers was to a agree on a standard specification for a software module called SecOC aiming at authenticating messages in vehicular network.

Indeed, as å€é£ã®åžã§éã¶ã²ãŒã now, most of these messages, which can control safety critical systems like brakes or steering, can be easily spoofed.

However, the SecOC specification does not define which cryptographic algorithm is used or which parameters are adequate.

Moreover, the overall achievable security is limited by the length of messages, which can only have up to 8 bytes in the case of the CAN network.

In this paper, we propose a new security model under which it is possible to derive a sufficient security level even under these limiting factors, and examine the security of some algorithms and parameters that have been suggested for the SecOC.

Our construction is an optimized variant of the RLWE key exchange proposed by Ding et al.

Our protocol is a RLWE variant of the classic Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, which can be regarded as a direct drop-in replacement for read more widely-deployed Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and its variants, e.

We believe that our proposal is secure, efficient, simple and elegant with wide application prospect.

Concrete security level analysis on different parameter choices will be given in a companion paper.

Since the number of samples in their scheme is just one, which is different from the case of normal integer LWE or other RLWE instances, we do the security analysis for Ding key exchange by primal attack which is reducing the RLWE to SIS.

Hence we can expand the dimension of the attack basis to double.

We adopt both the progressive BKZ simulator and the so called 2016 estimation in New Hope paper.

In addition, we discussed the key reuse attack and claim that Ding key exchange should not execute key reuse.

And we proposed a reconciliation-based key reusable RLWE key exchange protocol in the end.

PAKE protocols can be employed to hand-held devices for access control of sensitive personal data remotely.

For communication with more than one user, the user needs to remember all passwords between other users.

To resolve this problem, a three-party PAKE 3PAKE protocol, where user only shares a password with a server, is introduced.

In this paper, we construct a novel lattice-based three-party PAKE protocol, AtLast, based on the hardness of ring-LWE assumption, with a simple design and extend Ding et al.

Then, we compare our protocol with Xu et al.

They replace the original sampling algorithm SamplePre by Gentry et al.

Thus, this paper revisits the CK17 scheme and makes an advanced definition which is subring-identical linearly homomorphic signature, and suggests a security requirements on it.

Then, we show the correctness and subring-identical linear homomorphism of the proposed scheme.

They described this problem to find the equality of an integer within a set of integers between two parties who do not want to reveal their information if they do not equal.

For this purpose, they proposed the PriBET protocol along with a packing method using the binary encoding of data.

Their protocol was secured by using ring-LWE based somewhat homomorphic encryption SwHE in the semi-honest model.

But this protocol is not fast enough to address the big data ãããã¯ãããŠããªããããã³ã°ã²ãŒã 500 in some practical applications.

Here we did our experiments for finding the equalities of 8~64-bit integers.

Furthermore, our experiments show that our protocol is able to evaluate more than one million resp.

Besides, our protocol works more than 8~20 in magnitude than that of Saha and Koshiba.

IGE mode is not included in standard mode of operation recommended by National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST in 2001.

Block cipher encrypts fixed length of plaintext into the corresponding fixed-length of ciphertext using a secret key shared by two parties and utilizes lots of mode of operation for various length of plaintext.

Thus, we need to verify the security of IGE mode depending on underlying block ciphers.

In this paper, we show that IGE mode block cipher used in Telegram assuming sPRF is not IND-qCPA, but assuming qPRF is IND-qCPA.

As a result of more advanced functionality such as ADAS and autonomous driving being introduced, vehicles contain more software being developed and assembled by a number of different parties such as OEMs and tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers.

Moreover, as new use cases for the connected car such as controlling various vehicle functions from mobile apps, the addition of numerous communication interfaces as well as collecting and processing vehicle data in the OEM backend are developed, even more software is needed in the automotive industry.

To ensure software security for above scenario, there is a need to secure the automotive software development lifecycle.

This paper presents how to address security for each step in the software development lifecycle.

Many ideas of IDS for vehicles were already proposed so far.

Most of them can only detect anomaly CAN messages, but they cannot detect which ECU is compromised because any ECUs can't identify the ECU who sends illegal messages for the specification of CAN protocol.

Now we propose the smart CAN cable that identifies the ECU who sends malicious messages.

One is a CAN IDS.

The CAN IDS identifies an illegal message, and it broadcasts the hash value of the illegal message to CANBUS.

Another is an identifying module.

The identifying module is to memorize hash values of the messages and its sender ECU.

When the identifying module receives the hash value from the CAN IDS, it broadcasts the sender ECU information to CANBUS if it finds the hash value in its own memory.

We can cut the sender ECU from CANBUS, or control the stream of it, or handle other workarounds after we identify the sender ECU who sends illegal messages.

This paper shows how the smart CAN cable works, and its advantages and disadvantages.

These pre-shared keys are assumed to be partially leaked to an eavesdropper, Eve.

Because it seems difficult to resolve the problem comprehensively, we restrict our attention to a limited class of partially leaked key exchange graphs, called uniformly leaked key exchange complete graphs where every pair of players has a pre-shared key and each key has leaked independently with the same fixed probability.

Thus, this paper deals with how any k qualified players can generate a one-bit common key u from a uniformly leaked key exchange complete graph.

Specifically, we propose a one-round protocol that makes the k qualified players generate a common key u using edge disjoint Hamiltonian paths.

All existing FSS schemes are of p,p -threshold type.

In this paper, as in the secret sharing schemes, we consider FSS schemes with any general access structure.

To do this, we observe that Fourier-based FSS schemes by Ohsawa et al.

By incorporating the techniques of linear secret sharing with any general access structure into the Fourier-based FSS schemes, we show Fourier-based FSS schemes with any general access structure.

Private comparison is an import building block for applications such as secure auctions and privacy-preserving decision tree evaluation.

Our approach does not encrypt the inputs bit-wisely and requires only one multiplicative depth, giving about 44?

Also, the non-interactive property is useful for securely outsourcing computation to an untrusted server.

As a concrete usecase, we present a single round protocol for privacy preserving decision tree evaluation.

This is particularly useful in psychological researches since the number of available samples ãããã¯ãããŠããªããããã³ã°ã²ãŒã 500 such field is usually too small to support the normal distribution assumption.

Besides, special cares about the data privacy are necessary when to conduct the Mann-Whitney U test in an untrusted environment, such as cloud servers.

In this study, we build a privacy-preserving protocol for outsourcing the U test to an untrusted server.

In our construction, all the private data are encrypted using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and only ciphertexts are uploaded to the server, and thus no private information about the data is leaked.

We first design a new equality-to subprotocol which enables us to handle the rank of ties in the U test.

By cooperating with our previous greater-than protocol, we present a private protocol that computes the U statistics from encrypted data.

In many of these applications, a function named trapdoor one-way function plays an important role.

We improve Micciancio Peikert's trappdoor one-way function, which is one of the most efficient trapdoor, in the point of parallelizability and give experimental evaluations.

Therefore, blockchain does not have any central administrator or Certificate Authority CA.

However, Public Key Infrastructure PKI must have CA which issues and signs the digital certificates.

PKI CA must be fully trusted by all parties in a domain.

Also, current public key cryptosystem can be broken using quantum computing attacks.

The post-quantum cryptography PQC must be secure against the quantum adversary.

We combine blockchain technique with one of post-quantum cryptography lattice-based cryptosystems.

In this paper, we suggest QChain which is quantum-resistant decentralized PKI system using blockchain.

We propose modified lattice-based GLP signature scheme.

QChain uses modified GLP signature which uses Number Theoretic Transformation NTT.

We compare currently used X.

However, the huge volume of the threat intelligence data makes incident responder of some organization difficult to utilize those cyber threat intelligence effectively.

To realize this system, we propose a machine learning and natural language processing techniques to generate actionable threat intelligence using social media and other publicly available information sources.

In this paper, we tried to validate this approach with the prototype of the system.

We extracted 65 keywords from more than 800 CVE descriptions of National Vulnerability Database using TFIDF algorithm.

With the help of these keywords, we have retrieved nearly 230,000 tweets using Twitter API during the period of 4 days, from which we were able to extract actionable intelligence.

Accordingly, new security proof tools and notions in the quantum setting need to be settled in order to ç¡æã®ãªã³ã©ã€ã³ã¹ãããã¢ã¡ãªã« the security of cryptographic primitives appropriately.

As the random oracle model is accepted as an efficient security proof tool, it has been suggested to extend it from classical to quantum setting by allowing adversary's access to quantum power.

In this paper, we look at the background of classical, quantum-accessible, and quantum random oracle models for classical, post-quantum, and quantum cryptography, respectively, and how they are defined.

Finally, comparison of different ã©ã¹ãã¬ã¹ã®ããŠã³ã¿ãŠã³ã®ã«ãžãã®å°å³2019 eras are provided.

Uze Trillium Incorporated In-Vehicle Networks IVN were originally designed to be operated in a closed network environment.

However, now they are increasingly connected directly or indirectly to the Internet.

Due to its public access nature, connectivity creates several security vulnerabilities.

In this paper we present a hybrid learn more here security architecture for protecting in-vehicle communications.

To validate and optimize this solution, an ã¹ã€ãŒãã«ãŒãã²ãŒã ãªã³ã©ã€ã³ facsimile has been created for extensive real world testing ãããã¯ãããŠããªããããã³ã°ã²ãŒã 500 of vehicles.

IVN consist of many ECU with different security capabilities.

For this reason, we propose a series of different security strategies for different types of ECU and thus have architected a highly configurable testing platform.

The problem is that to keep Internet resources such as domain name and server in the cloud running, it requires the developer to pay and maintain the resource.

Meanwhile, the trend in current mobile application development is that after the developer published the application, they do not maintain it afterwards.

If the developer does not renew it then this resource will be released and obtainable by others.

The potential victim of hijacking this resource is the remaining user that are still using the app.

In addition to this, depending on the previous owner and how the developer use the resource, the changing ownership on this resource and the prevalence of join. ã«ãŒãã²ãŒã ã®å¿ããŠã³ããŒãç¡æ amusing effect will vary.

In order to shed light on this problem, we conduct an empirical study on it and investigate the threats that could emerge from abandoned resource inside mobile application.

By searching through hundred thousand of Android applications, we confirmed the existence of such resource inside the code.

Also, the emergence of quantum computers is not theoretical but is actually in ãããã¯ãããŠããªããããã³ã°ã²ãŒã 500 />Post-Quantum Cryptography PQC means quantum-resistant cryptography.

Lattice-based cryptography has been known as one of PQC.

Learning with Errors LWERing Learning with Errors Ring-LWEand Module Learning with Errors Module-LWE are the mathematical hard problems in lattice-based cryptography.

In public domain, Open Quantum Safe OQS project develops quantum-resistant cryptosystems such as lattice-based, code-based, and supersingular isogeny elliptic curve as open source.

We focus on lattice-based OQS projects such as BCNS15, NewHope, MSrln, Kyber, and Frodo.

In this paper, we check and compare the performance of OQS key exchange protocols using lattices.

Then, we suggest future work in OQS project.

Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most fascinating candidates of post-quantum cryptography.

This is due to the average and worst case provable security on lattice such as Learning with Errors LWE and Learning with Rounding LWR.

Lattice-based encryption scheme called Lizard based on LWE and LWR by Cheon et al.

Lizard was suggested to have great performance and high level of security.

However, Lizard could be exploited because of its C implementation.

In this paper, we investigate the way to break Lizard by side channel attacks such as timing and fault attacks.

From these attacks, we can find secret key from source code.

Finally, we propose countermeasures to protect Lizard from our attacks.

Therefore, NIST has opened a formal call for the submissions and proposals of quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms to set the next-generation cryptography standards.

Compared to web applications or high capacity hardware with more processors, IoT devices, including the massive number of microcontrollers, smart terminals and sensor nodes with very limited computing capacity, also should have some post-quantum cryptography features for security and privacy.

In order to ensure the correct execution of encryption algorithms on any architectures, the portability of implementation becomes more important.

Therefore, we investigate and implement several recent lattice-based encryption schemes and public-key exchange protocols such as Lizard, Kyber, Frodo, and NewHope, which are the strong candidates of post-quantum cryptography due to their applicabilities and efficiencies, and show the performance of our implementation on web browsers and an embedded device "Tessel2" in JavaScript.

Our results indicate that the efficient implementation of lattice-based cryptography on JavaScript-enabled platforms are both desirable and achievable.

Along with this trapdoor, two schemes EFCp- and EFCpt2- that apply this trapdoor and some modifiers were proposed.

Though their security seems to be high enough, their decryption efficiency has room for improvement.

Meanwhile, our approach does not interfere with the public key, so the security remains the same.

The implementation results of both decryption algorithms for EFCp- and EFCpt2- are also provided.

Verifier-local revocation VLR seems to be the most suitable revocation approach for any group since when a member is revoked VLR requires only to update verifiers who are smaller in number than members.

In 2003 Bellare et al.

EUROCRYPT 2003 provided the currently strongest security model BMW03 model for group signature schemes.

However, it serves only for static groups.

In ACNS 2016 Bootel et al.

Yet, ãããã¯ãããŠããªããããã³ã°ã²ãŒã 500 a fully secured lattice-based group signature with verifier-local revocation is a significant challenge.

Thus, we discuss two security notions to prove the security of VLR schemes without the member just click for source and to prove the security of VLR schemes with the member registration.

As a result, we present an almost fully secure fully dynamic group signature scheme from lattices.

After that, many homomorphic signature schemes have been proposed, but most of them are available for single user.

Some applications need a homomorphic signature scheme ãããªãã¯ããŒãºãã€ã¯ã²ãŒã ããã¬ã€ããŸãã multi-users.

Such signature scheme should be both homomorphic and aggregative, and it is called the homomorphic aggregate signature HAS.

As far as the authors' knowledge, there are only two HAS in the literature and both are linearly homomorphic.

One was proposed by Jing, and the other was proposed by Zhang and Wang.

In this paper, we propose HAS for polynomial funcitons.

Our scheme is obtained by applying Boneh-Freeman's method on Jing's HAS.

Using recent advances on cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies, Andrychowiczet al.

Improving on these results, Kumaresan et al.

CCS 2015 and Bentov et al.

ASIACRYPT 2017 proposed specific purpose poker protocols that made significant progress towards meeting the real-world deployment requirements.

However, their protocols still lack either efficiency or a formal security proof in a strong model.

Specifically, the work of Kumaresan et al.

The previous works left several gaps in terms of formalization and proof of security.

In that matter, we present two improved protocols called KALEIDOSCOPE specifically designed for poker game, and ROYALE the protocol for card games in general.

Both of our protocols closes this formalization and security undesirable gap from the previous read article as it concurrently: 1 enforces the rewards' distribution; 2 enforces penalties on misbehaving parties; 3 has efficiency comparable to the tailor-made protocols; 4 has a security proof in a simulation-based model of security.

Combining techniques from the above works, from tailor-made poker protocols and from efficient zero-knowledge proofs for shuffles, and performing optimizations, we obtain a solution that satisfies all four desired criteria and does not incur a big burden on the blockchain.

We establish security properties for our protocols comparable to those achieved by the bitcoin blockchain protocol.

Our security proofs entail a combinatorial analysis of a class of forkable strings representing adversarial behavior tailored to synchronous and semi-synchronous blockchains that may be of independent interest in the context of security analysis of blockchain protocols.

We showcase the practicality of Ouroboros in real world settings by providing experimental results on transaction processing time obtained with a prototype implementation in the Amazon cloud.

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